EFAA: Employer’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied
The Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals denied a law firm’s petition for rehearing en banc in a case involving the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 401—02).
In Bruce v. Adams and Reese LLP, 168 F.4th 367 (6th Cir. 2026) (available at https://bit.ly/489ywAX), decided on Feb. 25, the Sixth Circuit initially denied the law firm’s motion to compel arbitration.
In denying the law firm’s petition for rehearing en banc earlier in April, the court makes its position clear: the former employee plausibly alleged sexual harassment.
While other courts nationwide continue to grapple with EFAA interpretation in the absence of clear Supreme Court or Circuit precedent, this is not the first instance of EFAA interpretation for the Sixth Circuit, having previously deal with the issue of claim accrual in Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortgage LLC, 135 F.4th 398 (6th Cir. 2025).
Bruce, however, presented a different issue—whether the employee plausibly alleged sexual harassment—an arguably more straightforward interpretation, yet one that raises questions of heightened pleading standards.
While the case won't go further in the Sixth Circuit, the defendant law firm could bring it to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Statutory Background
As enacted in March 2022, the EFAA seeks to protect survivors of sexual assault and sexual harassment by allowing claims to proceed in federal court, instead of private arbitration. The act makes any “predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver” invalid and unenforceable for any case filed involving sexual assault or sexual harassment.
As enacted, the EFAA applies “with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after” March 3, 2022. Since enactment, the EFAA has been the subject of federal appeal eight times, most recently with oral arguments before the Second and Ninth Circuits. For additional background, see, e.g., Catherine Dirksen, “9th Circuit Weighs Limits of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault & Sexual Harassment Act,” CPR Speaks (Feb. 19) (available here), and Catherine Dirksen, “Second Circuit Examines Application of Arbitration Limits in Sexual Assault and Harassment Cases,” CPR Speaks (Feb. 6) (available here).
Case History Before the Sixth Circuit
A former Nashville, Tenn., Adams and Reese paralegal, Randi Marie Bruce, filed suit in 2024 after repeated, unwelcome statements from her attorney-supervisor, and disability-related accommodation denials. Although Bruce’s attorney-supervisor was not regularly in the office, she alleged that he “continued sexually harassing” her while “making sexual comments and jokes to and about [her], as well as making inappropriate comments about [her] appearance, clothing, and private life.” These repeated jokes made Bruce feel uncomfortable and avoidant while at work.
Concurrently with the unwelcome comments, Bruce managed various health conditions including post-traumatic stress disorder, sleep apnea, insomnia, periodic limb movement disorder, and restless leg syndrome. For her conditions, Bruce received a flexible scheduling accommodation, allowing her to arrive at work later than the other staff members. Eventually, her time accommodation was reduced by the law firm’s leadership and she was put on a fixed schedule.
The unwelcome comments and scheduling problems culminated in a meeting between Bruce, her attorney-supervisor, and several other firm leaders. Management put Bruce on a “corrective action plan” and she was warned that she could be terminated if she arrived late to work again. Bruce attempted to alter her medication to comply with the plan, but after several late arrivals, Adams and Reese, which is based in New Orleans, terminated her on May 11, 2023.
The law firm employer moved to dismiss the lawsuit and moved to compel arbitration, in compliance with Bruce’s employee arbitration clause. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee subsequently denied the motions with respect to Bruce’s hostile work environment claims.
Before the Sixth Circuit, Adams and Reese reiterated its position that the allegations of sexual assault should be read according to the “plausibility pleading standard,” which is discussed at length in the case.
But in addressing this argument, the Sixth Circuit decided to “leave [specifying the pleading standard] for another day.” Instead, the appellate panel decided that regardless of the pleading standard, Bruce’s complaint “passes the higher bar.” Thus, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Middle District of Tennessee’s finding.
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Bruce v. Adams and Reese, LLP can be viewed directly at this link.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc
On March 11, following the Sixth Circuit’s Feb. 25 decision, Adams and Reese filed a Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc, reiterating many of its initial arguments on appeal.
Notably, Adams and Reese argued that the court’s opinion “effectively creates a new standard in this circuit in direct conflict with Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent on pleading Title VII cases. . . .”
But while the Title VII pleading standard has established Supreme Court precedent, the EFAA pleading standard does not. This argument only reaffirms the need for clear guidance from the Supreme Court about the EFAA’s interpretation.
The Sixth Circuit subsequently denied the firm’s petition on April 9, concluding that “the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case.”
Adams and Reese has until Wednesday, July 8—90 days from the April 9 denial—to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. If filed and granted, this case would be the first EFAA-related review for the nation's top Court.
At the time of this writing, counsel for Adams and Reese has not responded to a request for comment.
The Sixth Circuit’s docket in Bruce v. Adams and Reese, LLP can be viewed directly at this link.
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The author is a CPR Institute Spring 2026 semester intern and is a second-year student at Brooklyn Law School in New York.
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