Supreme Court Hears Case on Federal Courts’ Powers to Confirm Arbitration Awards

By Sasha Hill and Russ Bleemer

The U.S. Supreme Court appears ready to broaden the powers of federal courts regarding their ability to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act.  In this morning's arguments, the justices had difficulty with interrupting subsequent federal court jurisdiction over awards where a case already has been the subject of a federal court litigation stay.

The dry subject of federal court jurisdiction covered this morning in  Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, No. 25-83 (Supreme Court docket page available at https://bit.ly/4qZsL0z) is a fundamental part of the life of litigators, and an essential area of attention for those seeking to enforce an arbitration award. 

Until today’s arguments, litigants seeking confirmation or removal of an award under the Federal Arbitration Act Sections 9 and 10 needed to satisfy federal court jurisdiction requirements—diversity, or amount-in-question, which has been $75,000.

But respondent Andre Balazs Properties—the owner of Hollywood’s Chateau Marmont, which was a defendant in the employment discrimination case that evolved to an arbitration matter at the nation's top Court—won in lower courts, confirming its award against its former employee based on continuing jurisdiction. 

The Court appears ready to head that way despite the petitioner-former employee's arguments that the four-year-old Supreme Court decision in  Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022) (available at https://bit.ly/4cKK1lt), which held that  federal courts may exercise jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award only if there exists a clear, independent jurisdictional basis on the face of the dispute, should control the case and require a separate court action for confirmation.

The petitioner’s attorney, Adam G. Unikowsky, a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Jenner & Block, had a tough time on the practical effects of his case asking for a separate, federal court action under FAA Sections 9 and 10 where a federal court case already was filed and a stay of litigation was issued.

“Don’t you think there is something odd about this?” asked Justice Clarence Thomas at the outset of Unikowsky’s argument.

“I’m having trouble understanding your lawsuit,” said Justice Sonia Sotomayor soon after, adding “Why isn’t this just a motion to confirm?”

Echoing Justice Thomas, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson said closure in the case from another court rather than where jurisdiction had been held on the stay motion “seems very odd,” and emphasized Thomas’s point that Unikowsky’s client had requested the federal court stay to begin the proceedings.

Then Justice Brett Kavanaugh said that the petitioner-employee’s insistence on bouncing between the original claims and then either state or federal court for  jurisdiction on award confirmation “seems like an odd result.”  Justice Neil Gorsuch piggybacked on Kavanaugh's question with the same skepticism. 

On the other hand, Daniel L. Geyser, a partner in the Dallas office of Haynes and Boone who represents the hotel chain-respondent, emphasized that Badgerow did not have a previous action in federal court. Geyser spent a chunk of his argument explaining his client’s alternative "anchor" jurisdiction theories—that the case carried federal court jurisdiction under FAA Sections 9 and 10 precisely because of the FAA Sec. 3 stay, and that principles of ancillary jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367, “Supplemental Jurisdiction” a 1990 law covering “Judiciary and Judicial Procedure” meant the action in federal court confirming his client's award was valid.

The second FAA action, either confirmation or a move to vacate the award, argued Geyser, “is a contractual resolution of the claim that was pending,” not a new federal court action requiring diversity or original jurisdiction.

The 28 U.S.C. 1367 analysis was a part of today’s arguments because otherwise, the confirmation or move to overturn an arbitration award would go to a state court, which was the Badgerow result, where there was no previous FAA Sec. 3 federal court matter as a potential jurisdictional anchor. Geyser sought the Sec. 1367 supplemental jurisdiction help for his argument as an equal alternative to the Court adopting the jurisdictional anchor approach, as Jules involves both state and federal claims.

The Court worked with Geyser on the “common nucleus of operative act,” a case-driven standard that would allow Sec. 1367 to supply supplemental jurisdiction for the Jules award confirmation move.

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Refresh CPR Speaks for argument updates throughout the day. Last Update: 2:23 pm.

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The precise issue presented in Jules is whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and then stays a case pending arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Federal Arbitration Act Section 9 or 10 application, where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.

In Jules, a court first exercised jurisdiction in the employment discrimination suit filed by Petitioner Adrian Jules, a former employee at the Chateau Marmont. The Southern New York U.S. District Court, fielding both California and New York claims--in a messy procedural case that included periods in which Jules declined to participate, according to court papers--stayed litigation in the case pending arbitration under FAA Sec. 3.

Later, the same New York federal district court was asked to confirm or vacate an arbitration award in the case. It backed the award, and the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed. Adrian Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, et al., Nos. 23-1253(L), 23-1283 (consol.) (Apr. 25, 2025) (summary order) (available at https://bit.ly/4bIAF7R).

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Hill is the CPR Institute’s 2025-2026 academic year intern from the Howard University School of Law ADR Program, where she is a second-year student in Washington, D.C. Bleemer edits Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation for the CPR Institute.

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